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BRIGGS v. SPAULDING.

decided: May 25, 1891.

BRIGGS
v.
SPAULDING.



APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

Author: Fuller

[ 141 U.S. Page 142]

 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

In the language of appellant's counsel, the bill was framed upon the theory of a breach by the defendants as directors "of their common law duties as trustees of a financial corporation and of breaches of special restrictions and obligations of the national banking act."

And it is claimed that the defendants should have been held liable for the losses which occurred through loans of the bank's funds and moneys during their term of office as directors, to Lee, his father, his wife and certain designated persons, which were the principal losses, though there were others smaller in amount for which they were responsible.

This liability is alleged to have been incurred by Lee for all loans from October 3, 1881, until April 14, 1882; by F. E. Coit for all losses through the mismanagement of the bank from October 3, 1881, until April 14, 1882, which could have been prevented by reasonable diligence and care on the part of the directors; by John H. Vought on the same basis and for the same time; by Charles T. Coit from October 3 to December 11, 1881; by Cushing from October 3, 1881, to January 10, 1882, unless his liability terminated with the transfer of his stock on the books of the bank; by Spaulding and Johnson from January 10 to April 14, 1882.

It is contended, as an independent proposition, that each of the defendants should have been held liable for all loans made during the periods before mentioned when the loans exceeded ten per cent of the capital of the bank, in violation of Rev.

[ 141 U.S. Page 143]

     Stat. § 5200, and also for all loans made while the bank's reserve was below fifteen per cent of its deposits, in violation of Rev. Stat. § 5191, where such loans resulted in losses.

And finally, that each of the defendants should have been held absolutely liable for all losses of the bank incurred by carrying on its business after its capital became impaired or exhausted and the bank insolvent.

Under Rev. Stat. § 5136, national banking associations were empowered "Fifth. To elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors, to appoint a president, vice-president, cashier and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places. Sixth. To prescribe, by its board of directors, by-laws not inconsistent with law, regulating the manner in which its stock shall be transferred, its directors elected or appointed, its officers appointed, its property transferred, its general business conducted and the privileges granted to it by law exercised and enjoyed. Seventh. To exercise by its board of directors, or duly-authorized officers or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing and circulating notes according to the provisions of this title."

By section 5145, the affairs of each association were to be managed by not less than five directors, to be elected at meetings to be held in January, and to hold office for one year and until their successors were elected and had qualified; and by section 5146, every director was obliged to own in his own right at least ten shares of the capital stock, and if he ceased to own the required number of shares or became in any other manner disqualified, he thereby vacated his place. By section 5148, any vacancy in the board was to be filled by an appointment by the remaining directors, and any director so appointed held his place until the next election.

[ 141 U.S. Page 144]

     Section 5147 provided that: "Each director, when appointed or elected, shall take an oath that he will, so far as the duty devolves on him, diligently and honestly administer the affairs of such association, and will not knowingly violate, or willingly permit to be violated, any of the provisions of this title, and that he is the owner in good faith, and in his own right, of the number of shares of stock required by this title," etc.

By section 5211, every bank was required to make not less than five reports during each year, under the oath of the president or cashier, and attested by at least three of the directors, exhibiting in detail the resources and liabilities of the bank, and the comptroller could call for special reports.

Under section 5240, the appointment of bank examiners was provided for, with power to make thorough examination into the affairs of any bank, and in doing so to examine any of the officers and agents on oath, and make a full and detailed report to the comptroller.

Section 5239 is in these words: "If the directors of any national banking association shall knowingly violate, or knowingly permit any of the officers, agents or servants of the association to violate any of the provisions of this title, all the rights, privileges and franchises of the association shall be thereby forfeited. Such violation shall, however, be determined and adjudged by a proper circuit, district or territorial court of the United States, in a suit brought for that purpose by the comptroller of the currency, in his own name, before the association shall be declared dissolved. And in cases of such violation, every director who participated in or assented to the same shall be held liable in his personal and individual capacity for all damages which the association, its shareholders or any other person, shall have sustained in consequence of such violation."

When the banking act was originally passed and this bank was organized that which is now subdivision seven of section 5136 did not contain the words "or duly authorized officers or agents, subject to law;" that is, the original act provided that the board of directors might exercise all such incidental powers as should be necessary to carry on the business of banking, as

[ 141 U.S. Page 145]

     there specified, but said nothing about the exercise of those powers by the bank officers or agents. The words were inserted in the Revised Statutes, 1873, 1874.

The articles of association of the First National Bank of Buffalo were framed under Rev. Stat. § 5133, and provided for an annual meeting of the stockholders; that the board of directors should appoint a president, cashier and such other officers and clerks as might be required to transact the business of the association and define their respective duties, and by their by-laws specify by what officers of the association or committee of the board the regular banking business of the association should be conducted; and empowered the board of directors to require bonds of the officers. The by-laws of the institution were adopted December 13, 1863, and had relation to the then powers of the board of directors. By section 13 a standing committee was provided for, to be known as the exchange committee, consisting of the president and three directors, appointed by the board every six months, which had power to discount bills, notes, etc., and was required to report at the regular board meetings. Under section 19 a committee was to be appointed every three months to examine into the affairs of the bank and report to the board. Regular meetings were required to be held monthly. It is alleged that on the 7th of January, 1879, the board requested itself to meet thereafter regularly on the first of every month, "to look after the affairs of the bank," etc.

It appears that the provisions of the by-laws were not observed, at least after the amendment in sub-section 7, § 5136, and that the management of the bank was left almost entirely to the officers. No exchange committee nor examination committee was appointed, and the meetings of the board were infrequent and perfunctory. For years prior to the failure, fourteen at least, the business of the bank had been conducted by the president.

It is not contended that the defendants knowingly violated, or permitted the violation of, any of the provisions of the banking act, or that they were guilty of any dishonesty in administering the affairs of the bank, but it is charged that

[ 141 U.S. Page 146]

     they did not diligently perform duties devolved upon them by the act.

Our attention has not been called, however, to any duty specifically imposed upon the directors as individuals by the terms of the act, although if any director participated in or assented to any violation of the law by the board he would be individually liable. The corporation after the amendment of 1874 had power to carry on its business through its officers. And although no formal resolution authorized the president to transact the business, yet in view of the practice of fourteen years or more, we think it must be held that he was duly authorized to do so. It does not follow that the executive officers should have been left to control the business of the bank absolutely and without supervision, or that the statute furnishes a justification for the pursuit of that course. Its language does enable individual directors to say that they were guilty of no violation of a duty directly devolved upon them. Whether they were responsible for any neglect of the board as such, or in failing to obtain proper action on its part, is another question. Indeed, it is frankly stated by counsel that "although special provisions of the statute are quoted and relied upon, these do not create the cause of action, but merely furnish the standard of duty and the evidence of wrong-doing;" and section 556 of Morawetz on Corporations is cited, which is to the effect that "the liability of directors for damages caused by acts expressly prohibited by the company's charter or act of incorporation is not created by force of the statutory prohibition. The performance of acts which are illegal or prohibited by law may subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its franchises, and the directors to criminal liability; but this would not render them civilly liable for damages. The liability of directors to the corporation for damages caused by unauthorized acts rests upon the common law rule which renders every agent liable who violates his authority to the damage of his principal. A statutory prohibition is material under these circumstances merely as indicating an express restriction placed upon the powers delegated to the directors when the corporation was formed."

[ 141 U.S. Page 147]

     It is perhaps unnecessary to attempt to define with precision the degree of care and prudence which directors must exercise in the performance of their duties. The degree of care required depends upon the subject to which it is to be applied, and each case has to be determined in view of all the circumstances. They are not insurers of the fidelity of the agents whom they have appointed, who are not their agents but the agents of the corporation; and they cannot be held responsible for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents, unless the loss is a consequence of their own neglect of duty, either for failure to supervise the business with attention or in neglecting to use proper care in the appointment of agents. Morawetz, §§ 551 et seq., and cases.

Bank directors are often styled trustees, but not in any technical sense. The relation between the corporation and them is rather that of principal and agent, certainly so far as creditors are concerned, between whom and the corporation the relation is that of contract and not of trust. But, undoubtedly, under circumstances, they may be treated as occupying the position of trustees to cestui que trust.

In Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Martin, (N.S.) 68, 74, 75, which has been cited as a leading case for more than sixty years, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, through Judge Porter, declared that the correct mode of ascertaining whether an agent is in fault "is by inquiring whether he neglected the exercise of that diligence and care, which was necessary to a successful discharge of the duty imposed on him. That diligence and care must again depend on the nature of the undertaking. There are many things which, in their management, require the utmost diligence, and most scrupulous attention, and where the agent who undertakes their direction, renders himself responsible for the slightest neglect. There are others, where the duties imposed are presumed to call for nothing more than ordinary care and attention, and where the exercise of that degree of care suffices. The directors of banks, from the nature of their undertaking, fall within the class last mentioned, while in the discharge of their ordinary duties. It

[ 141 U.S. Page 148]

     is not contemplated by any of the charters, which have come under our observation, and it was not by that of the Planter's Bank, that they should devote their whole time and attention to the institution to which they are appointed, and guard it from injury by constant superintendence. Other officers on whom compensation is bestowed for the employment of their time in the affairs of the bank, have the immediate management. In relation to these officers, the duties of directors are those of control, and the neglect which would render them responsible for not exercising that control properly, must depend on circumstances, and in a great measure be tested by the facts of the case. If nothing has come to their knowledge, to awaken suspicion of the fidelity of the president and cashier, ordinary attention to the affairs of the institution is sufficient. If they become acquainted with any fact calculated to put prudent men on their guard, a degree of care commensurate with the evil to be avoided is required, and a want of that care certainly makes them responsible."

Spering's Appeal, 71 Penn. St. 11, 20, was the case of a bill filed by Spering, as assignee of a trust company, against its directors and others, to compel them to make good losses sustained by the depositors on the ground of fraudulent mismanagement of the affairs of the company. And Judge Sharswood, speaking for the court, said: "It is by no means a well-settled point what is the precise relation which directors sustain to stockholders. They are, undoubtedly, said in many authorities to be trustees, but that, as I apprehend, is only in a general sense, as we term an agent or any other bailee entrusted with the care and management of the property of another. It is certain that they are not technical trustees. They can only be regarded as mandataries -- persons who have gratuitously undertaken to perform certain duties, and who are therefore bound to apply ordinary skill and diligence, but no more. . . . We are dealing now with their responsibility to stockholders, not to outside parties -- creditors and depositors. It is unnecessary to consider what the rule may be as to them. Upon a close examination of all the reported cases, although there are many dicta not easily reconcilable, yet I have found

[ 141 U.S. Page 149]

     no judgment or decree which has held directors to account, except when they have themselves been personally guilty of some fraud on the corporation, or have known and connived at some fraud in others, or where such fraud might have been prevented had they given ordinary attention to their duties. I do not mean to stay by any means, that their responsibility is limited to these cases, and that there might not exist such a case of negligence or of acts clearly ultra vires, as would make perfectly honest directors personally liable. But it is evident that gentlemen selected by the stockholders from their own body ought not to be judged by the same strict standard as the agent or trustee of a private estate. Were such a rule applied, no gentlemen of character and responsibility would be found willing to accept such places." And see Citizens' Building Association v. Coriell, 34 N.J. Eq. 383; Hodges v. New England Screw Company, 1 R.I. 312; Wakeman v. Dalley, 51 N.Y. 27.

It was in this aspect that Lord Hatherley remarked in Land Credit Company v. Fermoy, L.R. 5 Ch. 763, 772: "Whatever may be the case with a trustee, a director cannot be held liable for being defrauded; to do so would make his position intolerable." And the same view is expressed by Sir George Jessel, M.R., in his opinion in In re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co., 10 Ch. D. 450, 451, where he says: "One must be very careful in administering the law of joint-stock companies not to press so hard on honest directors as to make them liable for these constructive defaults, the only effect of which would be to deter all men of any property, and perhaps all men who have any character to lose, from becoming directors of companies at all. On the one hand, I think the court should do its utmost to bring fraudulent directors to account, and, on the other hand, should also do its best to allow honest men to act reasonably as directors. Wilful default no doubt includes the case of a trustee neglecting to sue, though he might by suing earlier have recovered a trust fund -- in that case he is made liable for want of due diligence in his trust. But I think directors are not liable on the same principle."

The theory of this bill is that the defendants are liable, not

[ 141 U.S. Page 150]

     to stockholder nor to creditors, as such, but to the bank, for losses alleged to have occurred during their period of office, because of their inattention.

If particular stockholders or creditors have a cause of action against the defendants individually, it is not sought to be proceeded on here, and the disposition of the questions arising thereon would depend upon different considerations.

In Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 608, it was ruled that gratuitous bailees of another's property are not responsible for its loss unless guilty of gross negligence in its keeping; and whether that negligence existed or not is a question of fact for a jury to determine, or to be determined by the court where a jury is waived. And, further, that the reasonable care which the bailee of another's property entrusted to him for safe-keeping without reward must take, varies with the nature, value and situation of the property, and the bearing of surrounding circumstances on its security. That was a case of persons, engaged in the business of banking, receiving for safe-keeping a parcel containing bonds, which was put in their vaults. They were notified that their assistant cashier, who had free access to the vaults where the bonds were deposited, and who was a person of scant means, was engaged in speculations in stocks. They made no examination of the securities deposited with them, and did not remove the cashier. He stole the bonds so deposited; and it was held that the bankers were guilty of gross negligence, and were liable to the owner of the bonds for their value at the time they were stolen. And Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion said: "Undoubtedly if the bonds were received for safe-keeping, without compensation to them in any form, but exclusively for the benefit of the plaintiffs, the only obligation resting upon ...


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